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Why does anyone care about the relationship between fiduciary 
obligations and contractual ones? 
Fiduciary theorists pay more attention the question than do contract 
theorists. The latter are more likely to talk about the relationship between 
contract law and tort law than about how contract law relates to the law of 
fiduciary obligations. This might be because tort law is more familiar and 
better understood. Or perhaps there are other reasons. In any case, this 
chapter takes it as given that claims that fiduciary obligations are like 
contractual ones are more about the purpose and principles of fiduciary law 
than about the law of contracts. 
Anyone who argues that there is a deep similarity between fiduciary 
and contractual obligations faces a hurdle: The two sorts of obligations are 
defined in very different ways. An obligation counts as contractual in virtue 
of how it comes into existence. Roughly speaking, a person acquires a 
contractual obligation by entering into an agreement for consideration. This 
simple formation rule applies across a wide range of transactions—anything 
from a corporate merger agreement to an agreement between family 
members. And it is neutral with respect to the content of the resulting 
obligations. Parties can, by and large, contract for whatever first-order 
obligations they wish, including fiduciary ones.1 
                                                
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This chapter 
benefited greatly from feedback from participants at the July 2015 UCL-Yale 
sponsored conference, Contract and Fiduciary Duty: Two Things or Just 
One?, and at the November 2015 McGill sponsored conference, Contract, 
Status, and Fiduciary Law. I am also grateful for helpful feedback from and 
conversations with Donald Langevoort, Paul Miller, Prince Saprai and 
Robert Thompson. 
1 Which is not to say that parties can contract for fiduciary remedies. 
Because this chapter focuses on possible similarities between contractual 
and fiduciary obligations, I largely ignore differences between the remedies 
that typically apply to each. 
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A duty qualifies as a fiduciary obligation partly in virtue of the 
relationship between the obligor and the obligee and partly in virtue of its 
content. As Peter Birks observes, the word “fiduciary” is Anglicized Latin, 
meaning trustee-like. Fiduciary obligations are obligations that are similar to 
those of a trustee. 
 
The truth is that “fiduciary” is one of those words which means 
what it does, and what it does is to form a bridge from the express 
trust to other analogous situations. . . . A fiduciary relationship is a 
relationship analogous to that between express trustee and 
beneficiary, and a fiduciary obligation is a trustee-like obligation 
exported by analogy.2 
 
The relationships that generate fiduciary obligations share family 
resemblance.3 Typically they involve an imbalance of power and degree of 
trust. But not every relationship of that sort generates fiduciary obligations. 
And an obligation is a fiduciary one only if it has the right sort of content; 
notably, only if it requires of the fiduciary some degree of care and loyalty. 
The category of fiduciary obligations is defined at least as much by the 
obligations’ content as by the relationships to which they attach. 
Given the different ways the categories are defined, it is not 
surprising that there is overlap between them. Some fiduciary relationships, 
such as that between an agent and a principal, originate in contractual 
arrangements. And entirely arms-length contracting parties might write 
fiduciary-like obligations into their agreement. From a purely analytic 
standpoint, the relationship between contractual obligations and fiduciary 
ones appears to be like that between organic produce and leafy greens. 
Membership in the first category turns on origins, membership in the 
second on structural features. Leafy greens can be organic, but need not be. 
Organic produce can include leafy greens, but also much else. The only 
analytic connection between the two is that both are ways of describing 
produce. 
But law is not merely a matter of definition. Claims that fiduciary 
relationships are types of contracts or that fiduciary obligations are 
contractual in nature are not meant to state analytic truths. Nor are they 
claims that the law of fiduciary obligations should be subsumed into the 
law of contract. No one is arguing that because fiduciary obligations are 
contractual they should be subject to the consideration requirement, the 
Mailbox Rule, or Hadley v. Baxendale. What is being claimed is that there 
is some deep similarity or continuity between fiduciary obligations and 
                                                
2 Peter Birks, The Content of Fiduciary Obligation, 34 ISRAEL L. REV. 3,8 
(2000). 
3 See John Glover, The Identification of Fiduciaries, in PRIVACY AND LOYALTY 
269 (Peter Birks ed., 1997). 
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contractual ones. “Fiduciary obligations are contractual,” is best read as a 
metaphor. It is designed to prompt the listener to look for similarities or 
connections that she might not otherwise see. 
This chapter examines three ways to unpack the metaphor. The first 
concerns the content of fiduciary obligations. The most plausible claim here 
is not that the content of fiduciary obligations is like that of contractual 
ones, but that the tools lawmakers apply to determine the content of 
fiduciary obligations should be the same ones they use to determine the 
content of contractual ones. The second possible claim concerns causative 
events. Fiduciary obligations and contractual obligations are both acquired 
obligations. They presuppose what Birks calls a “causative event.” In 
contract law, the causative event is typically an agreement for 
consideration. In fiduciary law, the causative event is entering into the right 
sort of relationship. The claim here is that there is a deep similarity between 
those causative events, one that illuminates the nature of fiduciary 
obligations. Third, much of contract law is made up of defaults, which 
parties have the ability to alter. Some fiduciary obligations are also defaults. 
Perhaps the mutability of fiduciary obligations reflects a deep similarity 
between the grounds of fiduciary and contractual obligations. 
This chapter discusses each possible claim. My goal is not to 
provide a definitive resolution to any of them. By disaggregating them for 
separate consideration, I hope to cast some new light on each. The thrust of 
my argument, however, will be that any similarity between fiduciary 
obligations and contractual ones does not tell us much new about the 
former. The reason is that the grounds of contract law are more complex 
than is sometimes assumed. I conclude by identifying some reasons for 
caution when wielding the “fiduciary obligations are contractual” 
metaphor.  
1 Content 
Is there anything that the content of contractual obligations tells us 
about the content of fiduciary ones? The best known claim that there is can 
be found in the work of Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel. Easterbrook 
and Fischel stake out a radical position: “Fiduciary duties are not special 
duties; they have no moral footing; they are the same sort of obligations, 
derived and enforced in the same way, as other contractual undertakings.”4 
This Part distinguishes several claims Easterbrook and Fischel make under 
this heading and discusses the grounds for each. I then describe and defend 
a minimalist contractualism about the content of fiduciary duties—one so 
minimal that it arguably does not deserve to be called “contractualist.” 
                                                
4 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 
J. LAW & ECON. 425, 427 (1993). 
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Analytic considerations already discussed suggest reasons to doubt 
that the content of contractual obligations can tell us anything about the 
content of fiduciary ones. A legal obligation is contractual not by virtue of 
its content, but by virtue of being generated in the right way. Contractual 
obligations are created by acts that satisfy the conditions of contractual 
validity, such as entering into an exchange agreement. They are, as 
philosophers say, content independent: the reason for recognizing the 
obligation does not turn what the obligation requires.5 Given that contract 
law says so little about the content of contractual obligations, why should 
we expect it to tell us anything about the content of fiduciary ones? 
Of course contract law is not entirely silent on the first-order 
obligations parties can contract for. Three generally applicable mandatory 
rules limit the performance obligations parties can put in their contracts. 
Courts will not enforce commitments that are against public policy, such as 
a promise to perform an illegal act; courts will not enforce terms that are 
unconscionable; and courts impose on all contracts a mandatory duty of 
good faith.6 But judicial interpretation and application of these rules suggest 
that they tell us little about fiduciary obligations. The public policy rule is a 
narrow one, emphasizing mostly third-party effects. Fiduciary obligations, 
on the contrary, look to be structured primarily for the benefit of the 
obligee. The unconscionability doctrine prohibits only the most extreme 
forms of advantage taking. It is a far cry from a fiduciary’s positive duties of 
loyalty and care. Moreover, substantive unconscionability usually must be 
paired with some procedural defect to render a term unenforceable. Finally, 
as Daniel Markovits observes, the duty of good faith “permits contracting 
parties to remain as self-interested within the contract relation as they were 
without it,” requiring only that they “limit their pursuit of their private 
interests according to the terms of their contractual settlement.”7 Contract 
law demands from parties no more than the minima moralia of the 
marketplace, obligations that fall far short of the duties of loyalty and care 
that characterize fiduciary obligations. 
If there is a connection between the contents of contractual and 
fiduciary obligations, it lies not in their substance but in the method of 
determining what those obligations are. This is one of Easterbrook and 
Fischel’s claims. They call for “filling gaps in fiduciary relations the same 
way courts fill gaps in other contracts. The subject matter may differ, but 
                                                
5 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers (pt. 2), 
in 46 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 79, 95-96 (Supp. 1972).  
6 The content of some contract types is governed by additional mandatory 
rules. Examples include usury laws, minimum wage laws and consumer 
protection laws. 
7 Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing Ex Post: The Non-
contractual Basis of Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
FIDUCIARY LAW 209, 213 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller, eds. 2014). 
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the objective and the process is identical.”8 Call this the “methodological 
continuity thesis.” No matter what the substantive differences between 
contractual and fiduciary obligations, lawmakers should use the same 
methods and procedures to determine their content. 
Stated at this level of generality, the methodological continuity 
thesis is fairly weak. It is satisfied, for example, by the proposition that the 
content of both sorts of obligations should be that which a wise judge 
would decide—a claim that tells us almost nothing about what the content 
of either should be.  
Easterbrook and Fischel fill in the methodological continuity thesis 
with a more substantive theory of how lawmakers should determine the 
content of both types of obligations: hypothetical agreement. When a court 
must fill a gap in a contract, they argue, it should seek out terms the parties 
would have chosen if they had had the time and resources to reach 
agreement on the matter. If, for example, the question in a contract case is 
whether a tenant had a duty to inform a lessor of an obscure term in a 20-
year old lease when the tenant was laying the groundwork to invoke that 
term, the court might ask whether, if the parties had thought about the 
matter when negotiating the contract, they would have agreed to such a 
duty.9 When a court seeks to determine the legal duties of a fiduciary, it 
should ask the same question: Given the practical problem that the 
fiduciary relationship was aiming to solve—according to Easterbrook and 
Fischel, some form of agency problem—what duties would rational parties 
have agreed to assign to the fiduciary if they were given all the time and 
resources needed to think the problem through? I’ll call this the 
“hypothetical agreement method.” 
There are two senses in which the hypothetical agreement method 
might be called “contractual.” The first is the sense I’ve been discussing. 
According to Easterbrook and Fischel, it is the method that courts should 
use to determine the content of contractual obligations as well as fiduciary 
ones. The term “contractual” seems especially appropriate in this respect, 
for the method feels especially natural when it comes to filling contractual 
gaps, where the parties have agreed on some terms but not others.  
The hypothetical agreement method might also be called 
“contractual” because a hypothetical agreement is like a hypothetical 
contract. In fact, the more common term in the literature is “hypothetical 
contract.” But here care is required. Hypothetical agreements cannot do all 
the justificatory work that actual agreements or contracts do. Thinking 
about what parties would have agreed to is a way to identify what terms 
can be expected to maximize their welfare. Self-interested, knowledgeable 
and rational parties will agree to terms that they expect to maximize their 
                                                
8 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4 at 429. 
9 The example comes from Judge Posner’s opinion in Market Street 
Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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respective gains from a transaction. The justificatory force of hypothetical 
consent lies not in the idea of consent, but in the welfare effects that it 
identifies. As Anthony Kronman observes: 
 
[O]nce we have concluded, for whatever reasons, that a rule is 
welfare-enhancing, the assertion that the parties to a hypothetical 
contract would voluntarily choose it adds nothing but rhetorical 
force to our conclusion; it is, so to speak, pure window-dressing. 
Hypothetical contract arguments are thus not really contractualist at 
all. They explain and justify their conclusion by an appeal to 
considerations of welfare alone.10 
 
Easterbrook and Fischel’s hypothetical agreement method is not so much a 
commitment to thinking of fiduciary obligations as contracts as it is a 
commitment to welfare economics. 
Once we understand this, we can distinguish the hypothetical 
agreement method from a separate contractualist claim Easterbrook and 
Fischel make: that parties should have the power to modify their fiduciary 
obligations, or that “[a]ctual contracts always prevail over implied ones.”11 
The hypothetical agreement method does not ask what terms the actual 
parties to a transaction actually would have agreed to had they actually 
thought about the matter. It asks what terms perfectly rational and perfectly 
knowledgeable parties would have agreed to if granted all the time they 
needed to reach an accord. These imagined actors are given perfect 
knowledge, perfect rationality and unlimited time in order to identify 
welfare-maximizing terms. It is not obvious that actual parties will arrive at 
the same result. On its own, the hypothetical agreement method does not 
entail that parties should have the ability to choose or alter their fiduciary 
obligations. 
One can get from hypothetical agreement to “[a]ctual contracts 
always prevail over implied ones,” with either of two additional premises. 
The first is that parties are better positioned, by virtue of knowledge and 
interests, to decide for themselves which terms best suit their needs than are 
courts, legislatures or regulators, which likely know less about the 
transaction at issue and do not have a stake in it. Alternatively or in 
addition, one might argue that party choice is a separate and perhaps 
sufficient ground for enforcement. The first is a common premise of pro-
market neoclassical economic analysis. The second is the defining claim of 
autonomy theories. Easterbrook and Fischel invoke both when they write 
                                                
10 Anthony T. Kronman, A Comment on Dean Clark, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1748, 1750 (1989). 
11 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4 at 427. 
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that “[t]o say that express contracting is allowed is to say that the law is 
designed to promote the parties’ own perception of their joint welfare.”12 
I will say more about the value of party choice in fiduciary law in 
Parts Two and Three. For the moment, I simply observe that Easterbrook 
and Fischel need one of these two premises, or a third, to get from the 
hypothetical agreement method to their preference for party choice. But 
neither premise is uncontroversial. It might be that in some, if not all, 
fiduciary relationships we can expect lawmakers using the hypothetical 
agreement method to arrive at terms that create more value than those that 
the parties would choose. That might be so because parties are imperfectly 
rational, because parties have imperfect knowledge of the risks of the 
transaction, because parties have insufficient time and resources to weigh 
pertinent costs and benefits, or because one party is more sophisticated 
than the other or enjoys other bargaining advantages likely to produce an 
inefficient outcome. Alternatively or in addition, it might be that the social 
interest in imposing one or another fiduciary obligation outweighs the value 
we attach to party choice. Sometimes the law imposes duties on persons 
that they don’t want. We might worry about attaching too much weight to 
party choice especially where there is an imbalance of power or the 
opportunity for exploitation—common characteristics of fiduciary 
relationships. In short, one might accept Easterbrook and Fischel’s narrower 
methodological claim about the value of hypothetical agreement without 
committing oneself to their more thoroughgoing contractualism about 
fiduciary obligations. 
This is important because the hypothetical agreement method has 
real benefits. To ask what obligations fully informed and rational parties 
would have agreed to is to ask what obligations best serve the parties’ 
interests. No matter what policies or purpose fiduciary obligations serve, 
they are clearly designed to protect beneficiaries’ interests. And as 
Easterbrook and Fischel emphasize, changing one term in a transaction can 
have unintended adverse effects on other terms. Just as adding a warranty 
might result in an increase in the price of goods, increasing or decreasing 
the scope of a fiduciary’s obligations might to affect other aspects of her 
transaction with the beneficiary. 
 
A beneficiary who does not value the new service or higher degree 
of loyalty at more than the cost of providing it is worse off, the 
opposite of a court’s objective; if the beneficiary does value the 
extra service at more than its cost, then the parties would have 
provided for this service by contract in a transaction-cost-free 
world.13 
 
                                                
12 Id. at 429. 
13 Id. at 431. 
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Because the hypothetical fully informed, perfectly rational negotiating 
parties take a holistic view of costs and benefits—trading off a cost here for 
a benefit there—the hypothetical agreement method should capture such 
negative welfare effects. Hypothetical agreement is a tool for thinking 
through the full range of effects a fiduciary obligation might have. 
That is not to say that hypothetical agreement is or should be the 
sole method for determining the content, default or mandatory, of fiduciary 
obligations. First, it is not obvious that welfare economics captures all of the 
law’s reasons for recognizing and enforcing fiduciary obligations. Second, 
the hypothetical agreement method provides less certainty than lawmakers 
might want. The most all-things-considered efficient mix of obligations 
often depends on empirical facts about which we know very little. These 
include parties’ risk preferences, how much they know about the law and 
how much it affects their behavior, and the power of reputational and other 
nonlegal incentives. The absence of information about the values of these 
and other variables makes it easy to tell just-so stories as to why a 
lawmaker’s or theorist’s preferred rule is the value-maximizing one. 
Nonetheless, the hypothetical agreement method is helpful for 
identifying unintended costs that a proposed change in fiduciary obligations 
might bring. If one holds that fiduciary obligations are designed to protect 
or promote the welfare of beneficiaries, it is difficult to see why all of their 
welfare effects—intended and unintended—should not be considered when 
determining their content. The hypothetical agreement method does not 
commit a theorist to welfare economics or efficiency as the only goal when 
designing fiduciary obligations. But it provides an important check when 
doing so. 
2 Causative events 
A second way in which fiduciary obligations might be like 
contractual ones is in their causative events—how one acquires the 
obligation. Because a contractual obligation comes from the obligor’s 
voluntary agreement to it, the law of contracts is often treated as the 
paradigm of a private power-conferring law, and contracts as a form of 
private legislation. To the extent that fiduciary obligations are voluntarily 
acquired, one might think they too are chosen obligations, and that 
fiduciary law is, like the law of contracts, grounded in principles of 
autonomy or choice. A more complete account of contract law, however, 
suggests a more complicated picture. 
There is no doubt but that contract law gives private persons the 
ability to purposively undertake legal obligations when they wish.14 
                                                
14 I discuss the themes in the following five paragraphs in greater detail in 
Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power and Compound 
Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726 (2008). 
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Sophisticated parties are able to determine with precision when contractual 
obligations will attach, what the content of those obligations will be, how 
their agreement will be interpreted, who will enforce it, and the 
consequences of breach. And they can achieve those legal results by the 
simple mechanism of agreeing to them, which is to say, by expressing their 
shared intent to achieve those results. In such transactions, contract law 
operates as a private power-conferring law. It gives parties the ability to 
undertake new legal obligations when they wish. 
That said, not all of contract law fits the model of private legislation. 
Contemporary contract law does not require that parties either intend or 
express an intention to undertake legal obligations.15 “Neither real nor 
apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the 
formation of a contract.”16 Parties acquire contractual obligations simply by 
entering into exchange agreements, which are not distinctively legal acts. It 
is therefore possible for persons to acquire contractual obligations 
unwittingly. Corbin suggests the following example: 
 
There seems to be no serious doubt that a mutual agreement to 
trade a horse for a cow would be an enforceable contract, even 
though it is made by two ignorant persons who never heard of a 
legal relation and who do not know that society offers any kind of a 
remedy for the enforcement of such an agreement.17 
 
The point is not that unexpected contractual obligations are common. It 
might be that the vast majority of contracting parties understand themselves 
to be entering into a legally binding agreement. But if so, that is an 
empirical fact, not a legal requirement. Contemporary contract law is 
designed to attach legal obligations not, or not only, because parties want 
them, but because they have entered into the right sort of relationship. 
This feature of contract law suggests that it is designed to do more 
than confer on parties the power to undertake obligations when they wish. 
Contract law is also designed to impose legal duties on parties for reasons 
that have nothing to do with their intent vel non to acquire them. Contract 
theorists have suggested various reasons for such a duty-imposing function. 
                                                
15 There are exceptions. Among the complexities is the nominal rule in civil 
law countries and in Great Britain that “[i]n order to be bound by a contract 
a party must have an intention to be legally bound.” THE COMMISSION OF 
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW art. 
2:101 cmt. B (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000). For a more detailed 
discussion, see Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 VA. L. REV. 1437 
(2009). 
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981). 
17 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 34, at 135 (1st ed. 
1950). 
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These include the social interests in protecting a promisee’s reliance, in 
supporting the practices of promise-making and promise-keeping, and in 
enforcing obligations of corrective justice that arise after a breach. Other 
evidence for contract law’s duty-imposing function includes courts’ 
openness to finding implied-in-fact contracts, the fact that a bare 
representation can generate an express warranty and default interpretive 
rules that are highly contextualist. 
The causative events that generate contractual obligations are 
therefore various. Often the events can be characterized as acts of private 
lawmaking, in which parties intentionally undertake new legal obligations 
to one another. But the conditions of contractual validity do not require the 
expression of such an intent. In other transactions, the causative event is 
simply agreement to an exchange transaction. 
This variety says something about the broader purposes of contract 
law. It suggests that with respect to the single duty to perform, contract law 
serves both a power-conferring and a duty-imposing function. I have called 
this the “compound theory” of contract.18 The compound theory maintains 
that contemporary contract law recognizes and enforces the single duty to 
perform for two very different reasons at once. It does so in order to give 
parties the power to purposively undertake new legal obligations to one 
another when they wish. And it does so in order impose legal obligations 
on parties for reasons that do not involve party choice. 
What about the causative events associated with fiduciary 
obligations? James Edelman has emphasized that that most fiduciary 
relationships are based on the fiduciary’s consent or agreement.19 Edelman 
quotes with approval the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Norberg v 
Wynrib: 
 
Although fiduciary relationships may properly be recognized in the 
absence of consent by the beneficiary—the consent of a child to his 
or her parents acting in a fiduciary capacity for the child’s benefit is 
not required—they are more typically the product of the voluntary 
agreement of the parties that the beneficiary will cede to the 
fiduciary some power, and are always dependent on the fiduciary's 
undertaking to act in the beneficiary's interests.20 
 
Fiduciary obligations are voluntary in the sense that one does not become a 
trustee, an executor, a guardian, a corporate director, a joint venturer, an 
agent, an attorney, a teacher or a priest by accident. One consents or agrees 
to the position. The resulting fiduciary obligations are therefore voluntary 
                                                
18 Klass, supra note 14. 
19 James Edelman, When Do Fiduciary Duties Arise?, 126 L.Q. REV. 302 
(2010). 
20 Id. at 313 (quoting Norberg v Wynrib [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226 at 273). 
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obligations, in the sense that they are products of the fiduciary’s voluntary 
acts. Does this suggest that fiduciary obligations are contractual in nature? 
Edelman is probably wrong to claim that all fiduciary relationships 
originate in the fiduciary’s consent or agreement. Courts have held, for 
example, that parents owe a fiduciary obligation to their children.21 
Although Edelman works hard to construe the role of parent as premised on 
a voluntary undertaking,22 it is not obvious that this is the best reading of 
how a person acquires those obligations. More generally, because fiduciary 
obligations are identified as such by structural features of fiduciary 
relationships and by their content, there is no a priori reason why they 
might not sometimes attach to non-voluntary relationships. 
That said, many fiduciary relationships are voluntary. Voluntary 
fiduciary relationships can be divided into two broad categories. 
Some voluntary fiduciary relationships come into existence without 
the law’s help. The relationships between teacher and student and between 
priest and parishioner, for example, are not in the first instance legal ones. 
They exist in and are defined by the social world in which we find 
ourselves, regardless of whether the law takes notice of them. The same can 
be said of some more discrete relationships that generate fiduciary 
obligations. A person who assumes management and control over trust 
property might become a trustee son du tort, whether she knows it or not.23 
Though these relationships are voluntary in the sense that the fiduciary 
voluntarily enters into them, there is no requirement or reason to expect 
that the fiduciary knows she is entering into a transaction that will alter her 
legal obligations in that way. 
When the law attaches fiduciary obligations to such nonlegal 
voluntary relationships, it looks to be serving a duty-imposing function, 
rather than a power-conferring one. Because the relationship can come into 
being without the law’s help, we cannot be sure that the fiduciary knows, 
much less intends, the legal obligations that attach to it. The law of 
fiduciary obligations in these instances is designed to impose legal duties 
on fiduciaries not because they want or have undertaken those duties, but 
for other reasons. 
And of course it is easy to imagine what those reasons might be. 
Fiduciary relationships are generally characterized by asymmetries of 
power, trust and vulnerability. Fiduciaries typically enjoy discretionary 
powers or privileges, whose exercise can significantly affect the non-
fiduciary’s well being. These powers and privileges often create the risk of 
opportunism, leaving the non-fiduciary especially vulnerable to the 
fiduciary’s breach of trust. In such circumstances, the case for legal 
                                                
21 See, e.g., M(K) v M(H) [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6 (Australia). See also Elizabeth S. 
Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents As Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995). 
22 Edelman, supra note 19 at 311-12. 
23 See, e.g., King v. Johnston, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1488 (Ct. App. 2009) 
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intervention to protect the non-fiduciary against neglect and opportunism is 
an easy one, and does not depend upon the fiduciary’s intention to 
undertake the obligation. 
If the fiduciary obligations that attach to such nonlegal voluntary 
relationships are similar to contractual obligations, they are similar to 
contract law’s duty imposing aspect—the fact that one can acquire 
contractual obligations unaware. The causative event in both cases is the 
choice to enter into a nonlegal relationship of the right sort. The resulting 
obligations might be said to be voluntary in the sense that it could have 
been avoided. Yet the obligations have not been voluntarily undertaken in a 
more robust sense. There is no reason to expect that the obligor objectively 
intends, wants or even expects the legal obligation. The law’s reason for 
imposing the obligation cannot therefore be the obligor’s intention to 
undertake it. 
This similarity does not tell us much new about fiduciary 
obligations. Contract law’s duty-imposing function is not distinctive, except 
in its pairing with contract law’s power-conferring aspect. The duty-
imposing side of contract law suggests comparisons to tort law or family 
law—other fields in which legal obligations are imposed in order to protect 
vulnerable persons, to deter harmful behavior, to compensate for wrongful 
losses, and so forth. A claim that fiduciary obligations are like the duty-
imposing aspect of contract law does no theoretical work. 
Other fiduciary obligations attach to legally constituted 
relationships—relationships that they cannot exist without the law’s help. 
Examples of legally constituted fiduciary relationships include those 
between executor and legatees, between guardian and ward, between 
corporate director and shareholders and between a licensed financial 
advisor and her clients. There are no executors outside the law of wills and 
probate, no guardians outside the law of guardianship, no corporate 
directors outside of the law of corporations, no licensed financial advisors 
outside of the regulatory framework they operate in. The relationships 
themselves are creatures of law. They are legally constituted. When a 
person knowingly becomes a fiduciary in such a relationship, she therefore 
understands herself to be assuming a new legal role24 that involves new 
legal powers and obligations—though she may not understand what all 
those powers and obligations are. Unlike parents, priests, teachers or 
                                                
24 Rather than “new legal role,” one might say “new legal status.” I’ve 
chosen “role” because “status” is sometimes associated with legal situations 
that are not chosen, such as being a firstborn child. My use of “role” 
encompasses both Hanoch Dagan and Elizabeth Scott’s “office” and their 
“contract type.” Hanoch Dagan & Elizabeth S. Scott, Reinterpreting the 
Status-Contract Divide: The Case of Fiduciaries, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND 
FIDUCIARY LAW  ___, [MS at 9-10] (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, eds., 
2016). 
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borrowers, agreeing to enter into such a legal relationship is perforce 
agreeing to the legal role and everything that comes with it. If the fiduciary 
obligations that attach to extralegal voluntary relationships can be 
analogized to the duty-imposing side of contract law, perhaps the fiduciary 
obligations that attach to legally constituted voluntary relationships are 
more similar to the power-conferring aspect of contract law. 
There is no question but that the laws that establish the roles of 
executor, guardian, corporate director and licensed financial advisor are 
private power-conferring rules of a certain type. They confer on private 
persons, who satisfy certain conditions, the power to enter into a new legal 
role. A person becomes an executor, a guardian, a corporate director or a 
licensed financial advisor by choice. In some instances the law requires that 
the choice be expressed in a formal legal act. To become an executor in the 
District of Columbia, a person named as such in a decedent’s last will and 
testament must file a petition with the applicable court seeking an order 
naming her the executor for the estate.25 To become the guardian of an 
adult, one must file a petition requesting assignment as such.26 In other 
instances, no formal act is required, though the fiduciary must express her 
agreement to the new legal position or status. Thus to become a corporate 
director, one need express only an intent to undertake the position, usually 
in the form of an employment contract. In all these cases, however, the law 
grants the potential fiduciary the power to choose whether or not to accede 
to the new legal role, and it grants her the role based on the exercise of that 
choice. 
I think the best available argument that the power to become a 
fiduciary of this sort is like the power-conferring aspect of contract law goes 
as follows: The legal role of fiduciary is just a bundle of Hohfeldian jural 
relations.27 To be a fiduciary of one type or another is to have a certain 
collection of legal duties, powers, privileges, immunities and so forth. The 
new powers are often especially salient. But what makes the relationship a 
fiduciary one is that those powers come with certain obligations attached to 
their exercise. To say that someone is an executor is to say both that she has 
the legal powers to maintain and dispose of the estate’s assets, and that she 
has the fiduciary obligations of care and loyalty in the exercise of those 
powers. To say that a person is a corporate director is to say both that she 
has the legal power to make certain executive decisions on behalf of the 
corporation, and that she has certain fiduciary obligations towards the 
shareholders. This way of understanding the role of a fiduciary suggests a 
deep similarity between legally constituted fiduciary relationships and 
many contracts. To purposively enter into a contract is also to knowingly 
                                                
25 D.C. Code § 20-304(f)(6) (2012). 
26 Id. § 21-2041 (2012). 
27 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
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effect a change to one’s jural relations. Although the new obligation to 
perform is the most salient change, contracts often also come with new 
powers, privileges, immunities and so forth. Both fiduciary law and contract 
law therefore give persons the power to purposively effect changes in their 
legal relations with others. Both enable private persons to alter their 
powers, privileges, immunities and obligations. At least some fiduciary 
obligations are therefore best understood as the result of private legislative 
acts, comparable to contract law’s power-conferring aspect. 
The above argument relies on picturing the role of fiduciary as a 
bundle of jural relations. The bundle theory of property illustrates the power 
of that analytic approach. Decomposing an apparently simple and natural 
legal concept into its constituent parts can reveal otherwise hidden 
complexity and contingency, and suggest alternatives that might otherwise 
remain out of view.28 But like other reductive projects, this mode of analysis 
can also have a leveling effect. It risks leaving important variables out of the 
equation.29 Reducing fiduciary statuses to mere bundles of jural relations 
tells us something important about them. But it does not tell us everything. 
In order to see why, consider a different analogy: to become a 
fiduciary in a legally constituted relationship is like acceding to a public 
office. Take the ability of the candidate who has received the most votes to 
become a member of Congress. Like other legal roles, to be a member of 
Congress is, from a one perspective, just to enjoy a special collection of 
legal powers, privileges, immunities, duties and so forth. The most salient of 
these is the power to participate in the legislative process. But the office 
also comes with legal privileges and duties. The Speech and Debate Clause 
of the US Constitution, for example, gives members of Congress immunity 
from civil arrest while attending or travelling to and from a session of 
Congress.30 The federal bribery statute makes it a crime for members of 
Congress and other public officials to receive anything of value in return for 
influence on their official acts.31 The power to become a member of 
Congress is the power to acquire a collection of new powers, duties, 
privileges and immunities. 
Like the fiduciary obligations of an executor, guardian, trustee or 
corporate director, a Congressperson’s duty to obey the bribery statute is in 
a sense voluntary. When taking the oath of office, she knows she is 
acceding to a new legal role. She might not be aware of every new power, 
                                                
28 See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, 22 NOMOS 
(PROPERTY) 69 (1980). 
29 For a similar point about bundle theories of property, see Thomas Merrill 
and Henry Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 
YALE L.J. 357 (2001). 
30  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6(1); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 614 
(1972). 
31 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2). 
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privilege, immunity or duty that comes with her new office. She might not 
know, for example, of her constitutional immunity from civil arrest under 
the Speech and Debate Clause. And she might not know that if she accepts 
a bribe, she will now be subject to criminal prosecution under the bribery 
statute. But her choice to assume the office, together with her generic 
awareness that it involves a new legal role, is enough to say that the new 
duties are voluntary ones. If she is later indicted under the bribery statute 
and complains that she is being held to too high a standard, one might 
reply, “You knew, or should have known, or could have known, what you 
were getting into when you chose to take the oath of office.” 
The example is relevant because there is an important difference 
between the power to become a member of Congress and the power to 
enter into a contract. The duties that the bribery statute imposes on 
members of Congress are voluntary in the sense that they are the knowable 
consequences of the decision to become a member of Congress. They are 
not, however, what we expect to motivate individuals to run for Congress. 
We do not expect people to seek to become members of Congress for the 
sake of the new legal duties they will thereby acquire. 
Contractual obligations are different. Because contracts originate in 
exchange agreements, a person’s reasons for entering into a contract are 
more closely tied to her resulting obligations. In a contractual exchange, 
one side undertakes an obligation as the price of the other side’s return 
promise or performance. In the language of the Second Restatement, “[i]n 
the typical bargain, the consideration and the promise bear a reciprocal 
relation of motive or inducement: the consideration induces the making of 
the promise and the promise induces the furnishing of the consideration.”32 
A party who is engaged in exchanges of this sort does not merely expect the 
resulting duty to perform. She seeks it for instrumental reasons. Undertaking 
the duty to perform is essential to achieving her plans and projects, namely, 
receiving some promise or performance in return. Her new obligation 
allows her to accomplish what she could not otherwise. Contractual 
obligations are not merely expected, but specifically intended. 
Both a member of Congress’s legal duty not to accept a bribe and a 
contracting party’s legal duty to perform result from the exercise of a legal 
power. The causative events are, in this respect, similar. But in other 
respects, the events are very different. We expect parties to enter into 
contracts for the sake of the new obligations they thereby acquire. We 
expect people to become members of Congress for the sake of the powers 
they thereby acquire, and not for the sake of the new duties. These different 
expectations correspond to a difference in the law’s reasons for imposing 
the duty. When contract law functions as a power-conferring rule, the 
reason for recognizing the duty lies in the social interest in giving persons 
the ability to undertake new legal obligations when they wish. That reason 
                                                
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. b (1981). 
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presupposes that parties often enter into contracts seeking the resulting legal 
obligations. Because we do not expect people to enter public office for the 
sake of the new duties they thereby acquire, this cannot be the reason for 
imposing those duties. All this is a long way of explaining what was 
obvious from the start. The purpose of the federal bribery statute is not to 
give individuals the power, by becoming members of Congress, to acquire 
the duty not to accept bribes. It is to impose on members of Congress the 
duty not to accept bribes, whether they want that duty or not. 
The question, then, is whether entering into a legally constituted 
voluntary fiduciary relationship is, with respect to the obligations that come 
with it, more like purposively entering into a contract or more like entering 
into a public office. There is considerable variety amongst fiduciary 
relationships, and there are probably at least as many reasons for becoming 
a fiduciary as there are types of fiduciaries. One person’s reasons for serving 
as the legal guardian of her mentally incompetent sibling are likely to be 
very different from another’s reasons for serving on a corporate board, both 
of which might be different from a person’s decision to serve as a licensed 
financial advisor. I believe that with respect to many legally constituted 
fiduciary relationships, however, there is a strong intuition that those 
entering into them do not typically do so for the sake of the legal 
obligations they thereby incur. Much more salient to, say, the position of an 
executor or that of a guardian are the legal powers the fiduciary acquires. 
The fundamental fiduciary obligations of loyalty and care ride atop those 
powers. The fiduciary’s duty of loyalty is a duty to exercise those powers in 
the interests of the beneficiary; her duty of care is a duty to use a reasonable 
level of knowledge and expertise in exercising them. Fiduciary obligations 
are, in this sense dependent on fiduciary powers.33 This conceptual 
ordering—which a bundle theory of fiduciary obligations does not 
capture—is often reflected in the reasons individuals choose to become 
fiduciaries. Although the fiduciary might know that by acquiring the new 
role she acquires those obligations, we do not expect that her to undertake 
the role for the sake of the obligations. 
This is not to say that fiduciary obligations are never salient. 
Especially when the fiduciary and beneficiary are engaged in an exchange 
of services for money, as are a financial advisor and her client, the scope of 
the fiduciary’s duties of loyalty and care might be a key part of the deal. 
Here the fiduciary is being paid in part for performing her fiduciary 
obligations. Where this is so, the fiduciary’s voluntary undertaking looks 
more like a contractual undertaking. 
                                                
33 For a more thoroughgoing and ambitious account along these lines, see 
See Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 63 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds. 
2014); Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235 
(2011). 
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This suggests that the category of legally constituted voluntary 
fiduciary obligations is mixed. Entering into some relationships within the 
category is, with respect to the obligations one thereby acquires, more like 
becoming a member of Congress. Entering into others is, in that respect, 
more like entering into a contract. 
The above analysis can be summarized using David Owens’s 
fourfold classification of moral obligations based on whether and how the 
obligation is dependent on the obligor’s exercise of a prior choice.34 
Obligations of the null grade in Owens’s schema are choice 
independent. Owens suggests as an example the moral duty to help a child 
in distress. The obligation to assist simply exists, no matter what prior 
choices the obligor has made. Some fiduciary obligations—any that attach 
to being a parent—are of this null grade. Their causative events need not 
include a choice by the fiduciary. The reasons for imposing those 
obligations cannot depend upon choice. 
A person incurs a first grade choice-dependent obligation as the 
result of her prior choice, but without regard to whether she knew she was 
incurring the obligation. By driving a car, for example, I incur a legal and 
moral obligation not to drive drunk, whether I know I am incurring it or not. 
Fiduciary obligations that attach to extralegal voluntary relationships, such 
as those between a priest and parishioner, teacher and student, borrower 
and lender, are first grade choice-dependent. The existence of the 
obligation depends upon an exercise of choice, but not upon the chooser’s 
knowledge of the legal obligations that she thereby incurs. Although the 
fiduciary obligation is choice-dependent, the law’s reasons for imposing it 
do not appear related to that choice. Fiduciary obligations of this sort are 
comparable to contract law’s duty-imposing function. 
Obligations are second grade choice-dependent “where someone’s 
choice puts them under [the] obligation only when they make this choice in 
the knowledge that it might have the effect of putting them under this 
obligation.”35 Owens suggests friendship as an example. 
 
Someone becomes my friend by spending time with me, by sharing 
various activities and experiences, by expressing interest and 
affection. And there are duties of friendship, things one is obligated 
to do for one’s friends but not for other people. Still, one ignorant of 
the prevailing forms of friendship (perhaps newly arrived in this 
country and simply “being friendly”) could not be held to these 
expectations.36 
 
                                                
34 The classification is introduced in DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE 
LANDSCAPE 3-6 (2012). 
35 Id. at 4. 
36 Id. 
 
 
 
What If Fiduciary Obligations Are Like Contractual Ones? 18 
 
 
The third grade of choice-dependence appears when a person not only 
must know that her choice will result in a new obligation, but must intend 
or appear to intend the obligation if she is to incur it. Obligations of this 
grade result from the exercises of normative powers. Promissory obligations 
are the example par excellence. A successful promisor undertakes a new 
obligation by virtue of her expression of an intent to do so.  
My analysis of the fiduciary obligations that attach to legally 
constituted voluntary relationships can be restated as an argument that such 
obligations can be either second or third grade choice-dependent. Many 
such obligations are second degree choice-dependent. The fiduciary’s 
knowledge that she will incur new legal obligations by assuming a new 
legal role might figure into the reasons for imposing them on her. They 
might, for example, remove an objection to imposing them.37 But the law 
does not require that she intend to incur the obligations. Fiduciary 
obligations are third-degree choice dependent only when we expect 
fiduciaries to not merely expect, but also to intend, those duties, and when 
that intention is a reason for their legal recognition. Only fiduciary 
obligations of this type are comparable to the power-conferring aspect of 
contract law. 
This Part has focused on the different ways a fiduciary’s choice 
figure into her acquisition of fiduciary obligations. The question is 
interesting because it tells us something about the sorts of reasons why the 
law might recognize those obligations. The relatively limited role of choice 
in the generation of many fiduciary obligations suggests that the law has 
other reasons for recognizing them. 
3 Mutability 
A third way fiduciary obligations might be like contractual ones lies 
in their mutability—the fact that some fiduciary obligations are defaults, 
which the parties can agree to alter. Although there are connections 
between an obligation’s voluntariness and its mutability, the two are 
distinct design features. Whether an obligation is voluntary, in the sense I 
am using the term, turns on the types of acts that generate the obligation. 
Whether it is mutable turns on whether parties have the ability to alter the 
obligation that would otherwise attach to their acts. 
This chapter does not address the positive question, whether or to 
what extent private parties can modify, or even extinguish, the fiduciary 
                                                
37 Joseph Raz distinguishes two ways that an actor’s awareness of moral or 
legal consequences can figure into the justification of those consequences: 
“positively as part of the reason for those consequences, or . . . negatively 
by removing an objection to them.” Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and 
Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 916, 929 (1982) (reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, 
MORALS, AND THE LAW (1981)). 
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obligations that attach in virtue of their relationship. It is today clear that 
some fiduciary obligations are defaults. John Langbein has documented, for 
example, the default status of many obligations of gratuitous private 
trustees, which “yield to the more particularized intentions that parties may 
choose to express or imply in their trust deal.”38 Langbein’s study, however, 
concerns only one type of fiduciary relationship.39 More ambitious claims 
about the general mutability of fiduciary obligations need to be backed by 
similarly detailed studies of the law governing other members of the genus. 
Nor does Langbein fully explore the extent of parties’ ability to modify a 
gratuitous private trustee’s fiduciary obligations. Parties might have the 
power to alter some aspects of those obligations, yet there might remain an 
“irreducible core” of mandatory obligations they cannot avoid.40 The extent 
to which the contemporary law of fiduciary obligations includes an 
irreducible core is another important question I do not address. 
I am also not going to consider the normative question: whether any 
given fiduciary obligations should be mandatory or alterable. Easterbrook 
and Fischel advance an argument for mutability based on the principles of 
welfare economics and an empirical claim about who can better assess 
which terms maximize party welfare. But pure welfare economics is hardly 
uncontroversial, especially outside of the context of corporate law, which is 
where Easterbrook and Fischel focus their analysis. And Easterbrook and 
Fischel’s argument about the relative capacities of parties and lawmakers is 
an empirical claim, which might or might not be true and which might 
receive different answers in different contexts or for different sorts of 
fiduciary relationships. More generally, it is not obvious that the mutability 
question should get the same answer across the full range of fiduciary 
relationships. The reasons to empower the parties to alter the fiduciary 
obligations of a corporate director or financial advisor might not apply to 
the fiduciary obligations of a guardian, trustee de son tort or teacher. 
Whether a fiduciary’s obligations should be mandatory, mutable, or some 
mix of the two is a design question to be answered on the basis of policy, 
purpose and practical effects. Given the variety among fiduciary 
relationships, it would be odd if the answer were always the same. 
This Part instead addresses two related questions. The first is an 
interpretive-theoretical one: What does it mean that some fiduciary 
                                                
38 John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE 
L.J. 625, 629 (1995). 
39 In fact, Langbein’s study addresses only one form of trust. He excludes 
from his study commercial trusts, charitable trusts, resulting trusts and 
constructive trusts. Id. at 630-31. 
40 See, e.g., Alexander Trukhtanow, The Irreducible Core of Trust 
Obligations, 123 L.Q. REV. 342 (2007); David Hayton, The Irreducible Core 
Content of Trusteeship, in TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW 47 (A.J. 
Oakley ed. 1996). 
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obligations are mutable? What can we infer about the law’s reasons for 
recognizing a fiduciary obligation from the fact the obligation is only a 
default? The second, related question concerns legal design: What are the 
considerations that should go into setting default fiduciary obligations and 
determining what parties must do to contract around them? 
The ability to purposively modify or opt-out of fiduciary obligations 
is itself a legal power. If parties to a trust arrangement have the ability to 
structure it so as to exempt the trustee from the no-conflict rule, that is 
because the law of trusts gives them the power to do so. More precisely, it 
is because the rule permitting the exemption gives parties the ability to 
modify or extinguish the obligation by expressing their intention to do just 
that. Where fiduciary obligations are mutable, the law governing them 
confers on private parties the power to change those obligations. Default 
fiduciary obligations, together with the rules that say what parties must do 
to alter those obligations, are power-conferring laws.41 
It does not follow that the law imposing the fiduciary obligation in 
the first place is power conferring, or that it is designed solely to promote 
party choice. Consider the tort of negligence. By agreeing to an exculpatory 
clause, private parties can contract out of liability for negligently harming 
one another.42 To agree to such a clause is to exercise a legal power. But it 
does not follow from the existence of that power that the primary purpose 
of the law of negligence is to promote party choice. In Owens’s 
classification, the tort duty of care is at most grade one choice-dependent. 
Although it might result from a person’s prior choice, say to operate a ski 
resort, the duty of care does not depend upon her knowledge that she was 
                                                
41 The above paragraph skips over some considerations that are more 
important to an understanding of contract law than they are to a theory of 
fiduciary law. A default need not be power conferring. It is power 
conferring when it can be changed by virtue of an act that expresses an 
intention to effect a nondefault legal state of affairs. It is not power 
conferring, or not only power conferring, if the default can be changed by 
acts that do not express a legal intent. Many contract defaults can be altered 
by such nonjuristic acts. In order to make an express warranty, for example, 
it “is not necessary . . . that the seller use formal words, such as ‘warrant’ or 
‘guarantee,’ or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty.” 
U.C.C. § 2-313(2). It is enough to simply make a representation about the 
quality of the goods. Id. § 2-313(1)(b). Similarly, “an implied warranty can . 
. . be excluded or modified by course of dealing or course of performance 
or usage of trade.” Id. § 2-316(3)(c). My sense is that there is not the same 
variety among the acts that can alter parties’ fiduciary obligations. I believe 
that parties who act to alter their fiduciary obligations generally do so by 
expressing an intent to effect a legal change. But this is only an intuition. 
Further work on the law in this area would be interesting. 
42 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1981). 
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thereby acquiring the obligation, much less upon the expression of an 
intent to do so. The ability to contract out of negligence liability does not 
entail that negligence law is designed to confer the power to undertake a 
duty of care. 
The point of the example is not that all fiduciary obligations are 
comparable to the law of negligence. I have argued that fiduciary 
obligations might be grade one, two or three choice-dependent. The point 
is simply that the power to alter an obligation does not entail that the 
obligation itself is the result of a power-conferring rule. Private parties’ 
ability to modify a legal duty does not tell us everything we might want to 
know about the reasons for assigning it to them in the first place. 
The same point applies to contracts. Without denying contract law’s 
power-conferring aspect, a clear understanding of how contract defaults 
work illustrates ways that contract law, even when it gives parties the ability 
to choose, is often structured to recognize values other than party choice. A 
more complete understanding of this aspect of contract law illuminates 
what sorts of conclusions theorists can draw from the mutability of fiduciary 
obligations. 
First, some basic concepts. Any mutable term, whether it belongs to 
contract law, fiduciary law or some other area of law, is the product of two 
rules: a default rule and an altering rule. The default rule specifies the legal 
state of affairs absent the right legal actor’s expression to the contrary. The 
associated altering rule specifies whose expression of what meaning in 
what form is sufficient, or necessary and sufficient, to change the default 
legal state of affairs. To take a simple example, section 2-314(1) of the 
Uniform Commercial Code establishes the implied warranty of 
merchantability: “Unless excluded or modified . . ., a warranty that the 
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the 
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.” This legal state of 
affairs is a default, for it applies only “[u]nless excluded or modified.” 
Section 2-316 contains associated altering rules, as it specifies several ways 
to exclude or modify the implied warranty. Section 2-316(3)(a), for 
example, provides that a seller’s use of conventional phrases such as “as is” 
or “with all faults” suffices to exclude all implied warranties. And section 2-
316(2) stipulates that when a seller does not use such phrases, “to exclude 
or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the 
language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be 
conspicuous.” 
Contract defaults and altering rules are often designed to be choice 
promoting. So-called majoritarian defaults seek to capture the terms a 
majority, or at least plurality, of parties would choose. Majoritarian defaults 
promote party choice in several ways. First, they make it cheaper for parties 
to obtain the terms they want, as it costs less to remain silent than to speak.  
Second, when evidence is lacking, majoritarian defaults make it more likely 
that the court will impose the term that the parties actually wanted or 
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expected. Third, majoritarian defaults are often easier for parties to 
anticipate, Family Feud style. Non-majoritarian, information-forcing 
defaults, which are sometimes termed “penalty defaults,” can also be 
designed to promote party choice. When one party is more sophisticated 
than the other, setting the default against the sophisticated party’s interests 
can give her a new reason to educate the other about relevant legal 
consequences—by expressly addressing them in order to contract around 
the default. Alternatively or in addition, sharing that information can make 
it more likely that a court or third-party adjudicator will enforce the 
agreement that the parties intended. Information-forcing defaults can 
promote choice both by informing parties what they are choosing and by 
improving the accuracy of enforcement. 
Contracts scholars have paid more attention to default rules than to 
the associated altering rules.43 I have written a bit about altering rules, and 
Ian Ayres has recently devoted an article to their design.44 Ayres identifies 
two variables in the design of altering rules relevant to promoting party 
choice: transaction costs and error costs.45 Transaction costs are the costs to 
the parties of specifying a non-default term. Error costs occur when parties 
fail to understand the legal effects of their words and actions, or when 
courts fail to assign those words and actions their intended effect. Designing 
contract altering rules to maximize the parties’ ability to get the terms they 
want requires minimizing, to the extent possible, both sorts of costs. 
Sometimes this involves a tradeoff between the two. For example, formal 
requirements like the use of a writing or the inclusion of standard 
disclosures can reduce the chances of judicial or party error. But such 
requirements increase the costs of contracting around the default. Magic 
words like section 2-316’s rule for “as is” or “with all faults” can reduce 
transaction costs. But when nonsophisticates do not know the code, they 
can cause party error. Maximizing parties’ ability to get the terms they want 
involves striking the right balance between these costs. 
In short, there is no doubt but that contract default and altering rules 
can be designed to maximize the parties’ ability to choose. Rules that 
                                                
43 See, e.g., Avery Weiner Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in 
Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 503 (2004) (observing that 
on the question of “how to interpret [parties’] efforts when they try [to 
overcome a default] . . . the default rule literature has had little to say”).  
44 Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, supra note 15 at 1461-75 (discussing 
the design of defaults and “opt-out rules”), 1475-99 (applying the 
discussion of defaults and opt-out rules to analyze the conditions of 
contractual validity for four types of agreements); Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-
Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032 (2012). See 
also Brett McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 
60 SMU L. REV. 383 (2007). 
45 See Ayres, supra note 44 at 2054-63. 
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exhibit the above design elements—majoritarian or information-forcing 
defaults, altering rules designed to minimize both transaction and error 
costs—can be evidence that the law is designed to promote party choice, or 
that it functions as a power-conferring rule. 
But default and altering rules can be designed to achieve other ends 
as well. They can do so in two ways: by changing the parties’ incentives to 
pick one term or another and by using the law’s expressive power. 
A default establishes the legal state of affairs absent a relevant legal 
actor’s contrary expression. Because parties have finite time, attention and 
resources, they sometimes fail to opt-out of defaults even when, other 
things being equal, they would prefer a non-default legal state of affairs. As 
a result, defaults are generally sticky. A default’s stickiness is largely a 
function of the altering rule associated with it—what it takes to opt-out of 
the default. As Ayres explains, “[t]he stickiness of a default derives from the 
relative difficulty of contracting around—particularly if the altering rules 
impede fully-informed contractors from contracting for certain non-default 
effects because of the costs of complying with the impeding altering 
rules.”46 Consequently, the stickiness of a default is partly within 
lawmakers’ control. Just as altering rules can be designed to promote 
choice by reducing the transaction costs of achieving a non-default term, 
they can alternatively be designed to impede party choice by increasing 
those costs. Writing requirements, prolix mandatory disclosures, magic 
words and the like can all increase the cost of opting out of a default. Such 
altering rules impede departures from the default. Impeding altering rules 
can be used to impose something like a Pigouvian tax on attempts to 
achieve a non-default legal state of affairs. 
Another way of putting this is that the choice between mandatory 
and default rules is not a binary one. There is a spectrum that runs from 
choice-promoting defaults and associated altering rules, which make it very 
easy to avoid a default, through to defaults with altering rules that make it 
more costly to avoid a default, and then on, at the far end of the spectrum, 
to mandatory rules that make it impossible to avoid a default.  
This is important because sticky contract defaults can be used to 
advance social interests other than party choice. By setting the contract 
default at the socially preferred term, lawmakers can cause more contracts 
                                                
46 Id. at 2086. The stickiness of the default depends largely, but not entirely, 
on the altering rule. Defaults that do not correspond to the parties’ 
expectations, for example, might stick because parties are less likely to 
know to contract around them, no matter what the altering rule. The same 
goes for a default against the interests of a non-sophisticated party, who is 
less likely to know that she should be contracting around it. Thus Ayres is 
not entirely correct when he writes that “what makes a default sticky . . . 
has nothing to do with the content or desirability of the default itself.“ Id. 
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to include that term, while still giving sufficiently motivated parties the 
ability to opt out of it. As I have written elsewhere: 
 
Stickier defaults, and by implication costlier opt-outs, . . . can 
mediate between the sometimes conflicting interests the law has in, 
on the one hand, granting parties the power to control the scope of 
their legal obligations and, on the other hand, imposing liability on 
parties because of extralegal wrongs they have committed, harms 
they have caused, or other considerations.47 
 
Ayres, an economist, identifies only two reasons why lawmakers might 
want to make a default stick: “to protect people inside (paternalism) or 
outside (externalities) the contract.”48 A broader view of the non-choice-
based reasons for imposing contractual obligations might include society’s 
interests in enforcing the moral obligation to perform, in doing justice 
between the parties after breach, or in supporting the moral culture of 
making and keeping agreements. Impeding altering rules are tools that 
lawmakers can use to achieve those ends, while still giving sophisticated 
and sufficiently motivated parties the power to get the nondefault terms 
they want. 
A second way that a default can serve values other than party 
choice lies in law’s expressive capacity. Because we live in a culture that 
expects laws to reflect collective values, contracting parties often read the 
default to signal a collective judgment about what sorts of terms or 
behaviors are moral, just, right, efficient or otherwise socially preferred. 
This can be another cause of stickiness. Contract defaults stick not only 
when it is expensive to contract around them, but also when parties treat 
the legal default as a signal and use it to guide their choices and even to 
form their preferences. But the point here goes beyond incentives and 
stickiness. The default implied warranty of merchantability, for example, 
does more than give merchants a new reason to sell goods of passable 
quality. It says what we as a society believe the appropriate morals of the 
marketplace to be. The rule caveat emptor no longer expresses what we 
expect of sellers. The expressive dimension of defaults provides yet another 
avenue for advancing values beyond party choice. 
In short, mutability does not entail that the default should either 
reflect the terms that the majority of parties want or be designed to elicit 
information to improve the quality of that choice. A default and the 
associated altering rule might be designed to serve goals that do not depend 
upon party choice, either because the default is likely to stick or because it 
expresses other social values. 
                                                
47 Klass, supra note 15 at 1472. 
48 Ayres, supra note 44 at 2084. 
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What does this mean for the theory of fiduciary obligations? I 
argued in Part Two that legally constituted fiduciary relationships are 
power-conferring laws in that they give parties the ability to choose 
whether to take on the role of a fiduciary. Default fiduciary obligations are 
power conferring in a different way: they give sophisticated and sufficiently 
motivated parties the ability to change their fiduciary obligations when they 
want. Insofar as fiduciary law builds in legal powers of this sort, it is similar 
to the power-conferring aspects of contract law. 
But like the power to take on the role of the fiduciary, the fact that 
the parties have the power to alter their fiduciary obligations does not tell 
us everything we might want to know about the law’s reasons for 
recognizing and enforcing those obligations in the first place, or even its 
reasons for permitting parties to modify them. To answer those questions, 
we need to know more about the scope of the parties’ power to alter their 
fiduciary obligations, about the law’s reasons for picking a default 
obligation, and about what it takes for parties to contract around that 
default. It will be important to ask, for example, how sticky a default 
fiduciary obligation is, and whether it is sticky by accident or by design. 
One would also want to ask whether the default expresses a collective 
decision about the appropriate duties of a fiduciary, whether it is 
majoritarian, or whether it is simply a coordinating rule. Again, there is no 
reason to expect the same answer for every sort of fiduciary relationship, or 
for every fiduciary obligation. Neither the voluntary aspect of fiduciary 
obligations nor their mutability can be understood from 30,000 feet. 
Understanding the meaning of either requires closer examination. 
4 A concluding caution 
There are several ways, then, in which fiduciary obligations are like 
contractual ones. Both are designed primarily to benefit parties to the 
relationship, making it important to ensure that their design takes into 
account both intended and unintended welfare effects. Asking which 
obligations fully informed rational parties would pick is, for both sorts of 
obligations, a way to check that. Both types of obligations are, by and large, 
voluntary obligations, in the sense that they come about only as the result 
of parties’ voluntary acts—in the case of fiduciary obligations, entering into 
the right sort of relationship, in the case of contractual obligations, entering 
into an exchange agreement. Finally both sorts of obligations are sometimes 
mutable, giving private parties the power to alter the duties that attach to 
their relationship. 
The question is whether these similarities tell us anything interesting 
about the law of fiduciary obligations. Contract law is often held up as the 
paradigm of a private power-conferring law. In fact, contract law serves a 
compound power-conferring and duty-imposing function. A more nuanced 
understanding of the design and functions of the law of contracts suggests 
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that the structural similarities between fiduciary obligations and contractual 
ones tell us less about fiduciary law than we might hope. (The differences 
between fiduciary obligations and contractual ones might be more 
revealing.) 
I would like to conclude by suggesting that not only are the 
similarities between fiduciary and contractual obligations uninformative, 
but too much emphasis on them risks importing into fiduciary law 
problematic aspects of the law of contracts. I am thinking here of the almost 
talismanic quality that, at least in the United States, appeals to consent play 
in the judicial interpretation and enforcement of contracts. Important and 
valuable though party choice is, the language of consent is too often used 
to obscure what is really going on between contracting parties. This can be 
seen especially in the governance of mass consumer contracts, which might 
put us on guard against attempts to understand fiduciary obligations on the 
model of contract law’s power-conferring aspect. 
As almost any cell phone owner or software user knows, consumers 
do not read or understand the contracts they agree to. Systematically 
collected empirical evidence backs this up.49 Yet courts often take the 
consumer’s bare act of consent—signing a credit-card application, clicking 
an “I Agree” radio button—as sufficient reason to enforce just about any 
term that the associated document contains. As many commentators have 
observed, such a rule effectively gives sophisticated drafters a carte blanche 
to include terms that are most favorable to the drafter. These include terms 
such as class action waivers and arbitration clauses that operate in practice 
to preclude recovery for breach and other wrongs.50 
The results can be problematic for at least two reasons. First, 
emphasis on the formal act of consumer consent can distract from actual 
disparities between the parties’ sophistication and power, and from the 
fairness and efficiency of the resulting terms. Our culture rightly valorizes 
freedom to contract and freedom of contract. It does not follow, however, 
that a consumer’s bare act of consent to terms she has predictably neither 
read nor understood should license their enforcement, regardless of the 
terms’ fairness or effect on consumer welfare. Yet much existing doctrine in 
the United States appears to do just that. When the only check on drafters is 
                                                
49 See, e.g., Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, David R. Trossen, 
Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard Form 
Contracts, 43(1) J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014); OMRI BEN-SHAHAR AND CARL E. 
SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED 
DISCLOSURE, Ch. 2 (2014). 
50 See J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive 
Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052 (2015); Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The 
Public in the Private of Arbitration, the private in Courts, and the Erasure of 
Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015); MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE 
FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013). 
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a consumer’s bare act of assent, we should worry that consumers will 
suffer. Second, the widespread adoption in consumer contracts of drafters’ 
preferred terms can result in the widespread deletion of rights that there is a 
social interest in maintaining. The contractual shifting of employment 
discrimination and other civil rights claims to private arbitration, for 
example, threatens to erode the development and effectiveness of those 
laws. The legal effect granted the bare act of consent also threatens broader 
social harms. 
This too brief survey illustrates the potential costs of a certain type 
of contractualist thinking. A final lesson from contract law is to be on guard 
against placing too much weight on acts of consent when seeking to justify 
the content and enforcement of fiduciary obligations. Appeals to individual 
choice and consent are powerful forces in U.S. legal culture, at times riding 
roughshod over other legal, moral and policy arguments or principles. To 
characterize fiduciary obligations writ large as chosen obligations is to 
locate them within that rhetorical space. Doing so can lend credibility to 
private attempts to contract out of fiduciary obligations when our attitude 
should be more skeptical. And it can obscure other social interests that the 
law of fiduciary obligations serves. 
